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Abstract
Following the recent global health crises, such as the 2014 Ebola and 2016 
ZIKA outbreaks, the international health community’s ability to deal with such 
threats has been debated. Amid discussions of how international health security 
(IHS) and related national health systems should and could be strengthened, the 
potential of harnessing the role of civil society organizations (CSOs) for more 
effective responses has been frequently raised. Such participation is often based 
on the notion that CSOs by their grassroots presence can more effectively help 
to address health security and health systems challenges in affected populations 
and communities. Using the World Health Organization’s (WHO) health systems’ 
building blocks as an evaluative framework, this chapter examines CSOs’ roles and 
responsibilities during the 2014–2016 West Africa Ebola Outbreak and how they 
can be further empowered to perform these functions. The chapter draws conclu-
sions about the opportunities and challenges CSOs represent for strengthening IHS 
and national health systems during public health emergencies in low- and middle-
income countries (LMICs).
Keywords: civil society organizations, health system, international health security, 
Ebola virus disease, West Africa
1. Introduction
Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) is recognized as one of the most fearful contagious 
diseases affecting mankind in recent times. The disease was first confirmed in 1976 
in Zaire [now the Democratic republic of Congo (DRC)] near the Ebola River [1]. 
Following this, more than 25 outbreaks have been reported in the DRC, Gabon, 
Sudan, and Uganda with high mortality rates ranging between 25 and 90% [2, 3].
Towards the end of 2013, the West African Sub-region experienced the first 
case of the EVD in Guinea [4], which rapidly spread to Liberia and Sierra Leone 
with additional cases being reported in Mali, Nigeria and Senegal. This outbreak 
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was quite significant regarding its unparalleled high morbidity and mortality rates; 
longevity and size; and how it increasingly became a global public health problem, 
resulting in the WHO declaring it as Public Health Emergency of International 
Concern [5]. By March 27, 2016, Sierra Leone reported the highest cases of 14, 124, 
followed by Liberia (10,675) and Guinea (3811) [6].
It is widely recognized that strong, well-funded and well-staffed health systems 
are fundamental prerequisites in the fight against diseases such as Ebola. However, 
the three most affected countries, Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, had suffered 
years of devastating civil wars that led to widespread poverty, weak infrastructure 
and a lack of health professionals, especially in rural areas. Consequently, the 
Ebola containment efforts were severely hampered by already weak and fragile 
health systems, including poor surveillance preparedness and weak governance 
systems [7–9].
Increasingly, a wide range of studies of international health security (IHS) gover-
nance and health systems’ functioning have drawn attention to significant shortfalls in 
prevailing institutional arrangements to deal with such pandemics [10–12]. Typically, 
much of the criticism has fallen on the WHO as the lead organization responsible for 
global health governance [10, 13, 14]. Problems such as not responding promptly or in 
an ad hoc fashion; creating panic among affected populations; limited lessons learnt 
from previous pandemics; bureaucratic and political barriers that constrain the estab-
lishment of appropriate communication and organizational systems and structures for 
responding more effectively-have all been cited [15, 16]. Overall, there is a perception 
that IHS governance is characterized by dysfunction. As a result, proposals for moving 
the IHS agenda forward have called for significant reforms, including better resourcing 
of the WHO to counter future pandemics as well as consolidating the global health 
community’s commitment and knowledge to promote and improve IHS both nationally 
and internationally [17–19].
Central to these discussions of how IHS and health systems should and could, be 
strengthened have included considerations to adopt more joined-up approaches that 
harness the role and strengths of civil society organizations (CSOs) [20, 21]. Such 
participation is often premised on the assumption that CSOs’ grassroots linkages 
and close proximity to the communities most affected by specific health challenges 
gives them comparative advantage in providing effective and targeted interventions 
that reflect local contexts, needs and realities, which add to promoting democratic 
and accountable governance processes in global health [22]. To date however, how 
CSOs’ engagement enables or constrains the search for effective organizational 
arrangements in the IHS and health systems strengthening agenda, is not well 
understood. Greater clarity on CSOs’ contribution is needed to guide action.
2. The expanding role of CSOs in IHS and health systems
“Given the growing complexity of these health and security challenges and the 
response required, these issues concern not only governments, but also international 
organizations, civil society and the business community. Recognizing this, the World 
Health Organization is making the world more secure by working in close col-
laboration with all concerned.”—Margaret Chan, Director General, WHO, World 
Health Day, 2007.
CSOs have a long history as significant players in global health and development 
that is well-documented [23–25]. The growing prominence of CSOs, especially 
in the health systems of low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), is related to 
the fact that CSOs have increasingly constituted preferred conduits for external 
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donor funding based on the assumption that CSOs by their small nature, flexibility, 
empowering activities are more cost-effective and better options for reaching poor 
and vulnerable populations [26, 27]. This position increasingly used by donors 
to channel aid to and through CSOs became particularly important following the 
implementation of structural adjustment policies (SAPs) from the 1980s onwards. 
As part of the dominant neoliberal agenda to revamp the deteriorating economic 
conditions that engulfed these countries, SAPs were used to curtail budget deficits 
by reducing expenditures on social services such as health, housing and education. 
Moreover, privatization and reduced role of the state were made pre-conditions for 
financial assistance and debt rescheduling [28–30]. The prevalence of weak govern-
ments and declining economies increasingly left NGOs as the only alternative to 
implement health and development interventions, especially for poor and margin-
alized people [31–33]. This resulted in a dramatic increase in their number, diversity 
and the functions they perform in health systems around the globe—a development 
that is largely seen in positive terms.
Within the context of IHS, CSOs have played significant roles in supporting 
large-scale epidemics or pandemics such as HINI, Ebola and ZIKA that have con-
stituted substantial threats to human security and public health around the globe 
[34]. Moreover, CSOs responses and contributions to fighting epidemics including 
HIV/AIDS, yellow fever, cholera and malaria have been widely acknowledged. 
Working on the frontline of public health responses, CSOs collaborate with public 
health authorities and local communities to provide primary health care and critical 
services, health education and shelter in affected communities that national govern-
ments will not or cannot provide for lack of resources [35–37].
Although the value of civil society participation as partners in global health gover-
nance processes and mechanisms is almost ubiquitously endorsed, there is paucity of 
evidence on the role CSOs play in the IHS and health systems strengthening agenda. 
What roles do CSOs play and are they appropriate? How well are these roles fulfilled? 
An emerging body of research from the recent Ebola epidemic in West Africa, reveals 
complex health systems challenges that have the potential to limit the extent of 
true participation [7–9]. However, little current literature engages empirically with 
CSOs’ roles and the advantages and disadvantages coming along with their engage-
ment. This paper aims to fill this knowledge gap through a synthesis of the evidence 
from individual studies on the nature of CSOs’ involvement in the 2014–2016 Ebola 
outbreak and their positive and negative effects in strengthening the health systems 
of the affected countries. The findings contribute to understandings of CSOs’ roles 
and functions when responding to public health threats in low resource settings with 
weak health systems. They are also significant for understanding how and where 
interactions between CSOs and the health system can be best leveraged to build more 
resilient health systems for containing large-scale epidemic outbreaks.
The chapter is organized as follows. First, we provide a review of the terms 
CSOs, IHS and health systems strengthening and their inter-relatedness to provide 
a conceptual framework for the study. Second, the methods utilized; and the results 
and discussions in relation to the contributions and challenges to CSOs’ engagement 
in the EVD response are presented in the subsequent sections. Lastly, based on the 
findings, conclusions are drawn about how to better embed CSOs’ roles in health 
systems in support of public health emergencies in LMICs.
3. Defining CSOs, IHS and health systems strengthening
Despite CSOs growing prominence, the term and its relationship to IHS and 
health systems strengthening is under debate. To better understand the CSOs’ roles 
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in these global health governance arrangements, workable definitions of the terms 
are needed. CSOs have been defined in several ways, however, the WHO views 
Civil society as “the space for collective action around shared interests, purposes 
and values, generally distinct from government and commercial for-profit actors” 
[38]. CSOs include a wide array of organizations: community-based organiza-
tions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), labor unions, indigenous groups, 
charitable organizations, faith-based organizations, professional associations, and 
foundations.
IHS or global health security on the other hand, is viewed as those functions 
concerned with preventing, detecting and responding to infectious disease out-
breaks, whether man-made or natural, to limit their socio-economic impact across 
national and international boundaries [20]. It is rooted in the International Health 
Regulations (IHR, 2005)—a legal instrument that provides guidance regarding 
how national governments should develop and maintain country-level systems 
and structures for containing diseases of public health importance [39]. Over the 
years, poor conformance of countries to the IHR resulted in an IHS agenda being 
launched in 2014 as a global partnership comprising over 64 countries, interna-
tional organizations and NGOs to promote country investments in meeting the 
IHR’s requirements [20].
The WHO defines a health system as all activities whose primary purpose is to 
promote, restore and maintain health [40]. Acknowledging the health strength-
ening systems agenda, the WHO also states that “a well-functioning health system 
working in harmony is built on having trained and motivated health workers, 
a well-maintained infrastructure, and a reliable supply of medicines and 
technologies, backed by adequate funding, strong health plans and evidenced 
based policies” [41]. This framework encapsulates what has become known as 
the WHO’s health systems “building blocks” [42, 43]. These include: (i) service 
delivery, (ii) health workforce, (iii) health information systems, (iv) medical 
products, vaccines and technologies (v) health financing, and (vi) leadership/
governance (Figure 1). Good service delivery entails the provision of services 
that are safe, cost-effective, of high quality, patient-centered and equitably 
accessible to all segments of the population that need them, when and where 
needed [42, 43]. A well-performing health workforce should be appropriately 
qualified, responsive, efficient and evenly distributed to provide the best pos-
sible health outcomes for the entire population within the limits imposed by 
available resources [42, 43]. Such providers include doctors, nurses, pharmacists 
and health management staff. A well-functioning health information system 
ensures the timely collection, analysis, and dissemination of vital information 
on health determinants, health system performance and health status [42, 43]. 
An effective health system ensures that essential medical products, vaccines and 
technologies of high quality, safety, efficacy and cost-effectiveness are equitably 
accessible and available for meeting the priority needs of the entire population 
[42, 43]. A good health financing system mobilizes adequate funds for health 
and ensures that people have access to the services they need without incurring 
any financial hardship or impoverishment in having to pay for them. Well-
funded health systems are needed to support other health systems blocks, such 
as workforce recruitment, procurement of medical product and implementation 
of public health programs [42, 43]. A good leadership and governance health 
system ensures that planned policy frameworks exist, combined with effective 
oversight and coalition building; regulation and incentives, attention to system 
design and accountability [42, 43]. Strengthening health system thus means 
promoting effective interactions between these six health system building blocks 
to achieve more equitable and sustained improvements in the public’s health.
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Originally, the health systems framework was not developed as a research tool, 
but as a means of promoting investment of resources in health systems [44]. In this 
study, however, it was selected for its acceptability by the wider international health 
community as a set of agreed health priorities that can be used to frame an under-
standing of what a health system is and how it can be strengthened [45]. Moreover, 
given that health systems are characterized by a diversity of actors, interests, 
activities and relationships, the framework was found useful for categorizing the 
unique contribution of CSOs among the range of actors responding to the Ebola 
pandemic. A recent systematic review of the building blocks’ importance for the 
Ebola Outbreak, as well, highlights their relevance in practice and as an evaluative 
framework [45].
4. Methods
This chapter draws on academic literature and other publicly available sources, 
including reports by international or non-governmental organizations to map out 
the roles played by CSOs during the 2014–2016 West Africa EVD outbreak. The 
authors reviewed articles published from 2013 to 2019 from electronic databases 
including, PubMed, Medline via EBSCOhost, Embase, Global Health and Cochrane 
library as well as relevant articles and Gray literature from Google Scholar, Scopus 
and relevant Internet websites (WHO, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF, Doctors 
Without Borders) and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Search 
terms (Medical Subject Headings (MeSH) and Keywords such as Civil Society 
Organization, Non-Governmental Organization, Community-Based Organization, 
Ebola Virus Disease, West Africa, Health Systems, and Community Participation 
were used to identify articles.
The review included only studies focusing on CSOs’ functions and challenges 
during the West Africa Ebola outbreak in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone as well 
as reports from international organizations such as WHO, CDC and MSF. Articles 
on Ebola Virus outbreak before 2014/2015 and those outside these three countries 
were excluded. Data extraction entailed initial screening of titles and abstracts for 
Figure 1. 
The WHO health systems’ framework.
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eligibility based on the objectives of the study. Subsequently, potentially useful, 
full copies of the article were retrieved for further screening and inclusion in terms 
of its setting, aims and design; which aspects of the health systems building blocks 
being discussed and CSOs’ role in this; major findings, limitations and future 
recommendations.
5. Results and discussion
There is a relatively small but growing volume of literature on the contributions 
and challenges of CSOs strengthening health systems while responding to the West 
Africa Ebola outbreak. This section presents findings pertaining to the six health 
systems building blocks. It cites some of the strongest examples where CSOs’ roles 
can be particularly strengthened and better institutionalized in countries to more 
effectively respond to future epidemics in relation to: leadership and governance, 
health information systems, service delivery, medical products, vaccines and 
technologies, human resources and health financing.
5.1 Leadership and governance
Strong leadership and good governance practices, including multi-scale and 
cross-sector response are critical in responding to major public health threats such 
as EVD. It underpins the other health systems components and constitutes the 
backbone of any effort to secure sustainable, responsive health systems to out-
breaks. However, the West Africa outbreak pointed out the lack of effective health 
governance, in terms of coordination, emergency preparedness and responsive-
ness (including limited resources-financial, physical and human) in the affected 
countries, which adversely affected containment efforts and thus requiring urgent 
assistance from international actors [46].
Of the six the building blocks, this study found the leadership and governance 
block as the major entry point through which CSOs’ distinctive roles become critical 
in responding to public health threats such as the West Africa EVD outbreak. This 
was found to be true at both the international and national levels. At the interna-
tional level, while it is well-recognized that global health governing institutions 
such as the WHO and UN, bilateral and philanthropic donors were initially slow 
to respond to the EVD, [46] it is also well documented that NGOs such as MSF, 
were among the first to warn about the epidemic’s unprecedented spread, which 
ultimately led the WHO to declare it as a ‘public health emergency of international 
concern’ on August 8, 2014. By early September, there was still no coordinated 
international response and again, it was MSF that called for the deployment of 
military biological teams as ‘a last resort, in the hope of bringing about a rapid and 
concrete action at the field level’ [47]. This eventually led to a launch of the global 
response beginning with the passing of the UN Security Council Resolution 2177.
At the national level NGOs contributed towards the establishment of multi-
disciplinary rapid response centers and teams across affected countries, such as 
the Emergency Operations Centers, National Ebola Response Center in Sierra 
Leone and Guinean National Ebola Coordination Cell as overarching governance 
bodies for countering the epidemic. The coordination efforts of these teams 
and centers were rendered difficult by the large number of partners involved 
from the international community, each with different priorities, expertise 
and volume of resources [46]. To address some of these challenges NGOs fell 
on globally approved approaches and tools to formulate plans and strategies, 
mobilized their resources, outbreak response experiences and helped to establish 
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ownership and accountability mechanisms-which are often non-existent in the 
public sector of LMICs. These efforts thus supported improved stewardship of 
resources and promoted an effective coordinated cross-sectoral response to the 
epidemic [47–49].
5.2 Health information systems
One central pillar of the IHR (2005) is for countries to have in place some type 
of public health surveillance system that has the capacity to detect, verify and track 
diseases rapidly and to ensure timely data sharing and decision-making among 
various national and international stakeholders including the WHO [39]. However, 
the prevailing national-level EVD surveillance systems (comprising of reported 
cases investigation, telephone hotlines for reporting events, contact tracing, patient 
screening at health care facilities and swab testing of corpses)—usually based on 
health facility information in the affected countries—could not rapidly identify 
infected persons and respond to alerts until they had died [50]. The complex nature 
of the response required coordinated bottom-up approaches to EVD surveillance 
(involving local communities, districts and health facilities) to quickly detect and 
report new cases; and NGOs were the first to champion the establishment of such 
systems. Thus in Sierra Leone for instance, the International Rescue Mission initi-
ated the creation of the Ebola Response Consortium (ERC) (consisting of a group 
of 15 NGOs with district-wide presence throughout the country) to supplement 
the national surveillance system and support the Sierra Leone’s Ministry of Health 
and Sanitation (MoHS) for responding to the EVD pandemic. The ERC collaborated 
with the CDC and the MoHS to design and implement the community event-based 
surveillance system by training pre-existing networks of community health workers 
to identify unsafe burials and persons showing EVD signs and symptoms. This 
helped in quickly detecting, insolating, treating and preventing further spread of 
the disease [51].
5.3 Service delivery
Similar to most countries in sub-Sahara Africa, health care services in the 
affected countries were characterized by asymmetrical distribution with significant 
disparities in health equity and access, as well as diminished appeal for services 
[52]. Collectively, these factors contributed towards the unprecedented spread of 
the outbreak. As implementing partners in the emergency response, NGOs often 
adopted operational flexibility by tailoring their activities to address evolving local 
needs in support of the national response bodies and ministries of health of the 
affected countries through the provision of a wide range of health services with an 
ultimate goal of filling existing gaps in the health system.
Depending on the local context and needs, some NGOs focused on refurbishing 
existing public health care facilities (district hospitals and health centers), while 
others were engaged in the construction of new EVD treatment units (ETUs) for 
providing clinical care to patients and to ensure the safety of clinicians providing 
such care [46, 52, 53]. Apart from supporting with the establishment of ETUs, 
some NGOs engaged in social mobilization, community empowerment and public 
education activities to educate community members on how to recognize EVD 
signs and symptoms and refer potentially infected individuals to the nearest health 
facility. Significantly, these social mobilization and educational outreach efforts 
allow CSOs to maintain a continuous and integrated chain of functions that brings 
together the local communities, health centers and hospitals for more effective 
service delivery [46].
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Moreover, while the international communities’ approach to responding to such 
epidemics most often seek to halt or prevent new transmissions [54], most NGOs 
adopted a two pronged approach to service delivery in which the prevention of new 
infections and the improvement of clinical outcomes for infected patients were 
concurrently prioritized as mutually interdependent objectives in responding to the 
EVD outbreak [46].
In addition, due to the tendency for Ebola survivors to become susceptible to 
social, economic, psychological and clinical challenges, including the experience 
of stigmatization, economic deprivation and other health conditions [54], NGOs 
supported with the establishment of post-epidemic survivor programs and associa-
tions (e.g., Sierra Leone Association of Ebola Survivors) in the affected countries 
collaborating with ministries of health and other international agencies. Such 
programs have included the enrollment of survivors in vocational and literacy 
training, employing survivors to lead community mobilization and empower-
ment initiatives in Ebola affected communities as well as the provision of critical 
health care services to diagnose and treat the clinical sequelae of EVD that includes 
vision impairment, hearing loss, mental health and other physical ailments [55]. 
By providing these medical and socio-economic responses, NGOs were not only 
able to treat more Ebola patients and prevented further spread of the virus among 
family and community members but also helped survivors to revert to normal lives 
post-epidemic.
5.4 Medical products, vaccines and technologies
Another health system building block related to service delivery, including 
medical products (vaccines, drugs, medical devices) which are central in delivering 
an emergency response were lacking in the affected countries and severely ham-
pered containment efforts. In order to fill some of these health system gaps, most 
CSOs considered developing new vaccines, rapid diagnostic and therapeutic tools to 
be critically important in fighting the epidemic. Thus, most sought to leverage the 
expertise and resources of governmental public health agencies, e.g., the CDC, UK’s 
Public Health England and Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention that 
specialize in the development of vaccines and laboratory testing tools. Apart from 
supporting the development of these tools, local laboratory technicians and other 
health professionals were trained in their use for diagnosing Ebola [46].
5.5 Human resources
Effective emergency preparedness and responsiveness to public health threats 
such as EVD requires essential human resources for health in terms of numbers 
and availability, appropriate training, expertise and motivation, and deployment. 
However, the three affected West African countries lacked such well-trained and 
motivated health work force. Consequently, how to recruit, train, protect, and pay 
a health work force that included government employees, temporary workers, and 
many international volunteers of various expertise were central concerns in the 
efforts to contain the epidemic. Working in close collaboration with international 
actors and the health system CSOs supported the West Africa outbreak with a mix 
of health workforce including doctors, nurses, laboratory personnel, public health 
specialists and risk-communication professionals [56].
Additionally, since the success with which public health threats such as EVD can 
be contained depends on the knowledge, skills and experience of first responders in 
affected communities [57], many CSOs sought to strengthen the emergency Ebola 
response by training thousands of clinicians, non-clinicians, nurses and volunteers 
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in infection, prevention and control measures (IPC). This included triage and 
disinfection procedures, use of protective clothing, and safe disposal of waste in 
public hospitals and rural clinics to limit the risk of transmission [56]. Others also 
provided training to community health workers and community leaders in first aid, 
public hygiene promotion among the at-risk populations, EVD signs and symptoms 
identification and provision of psycho-social support and counseling for affected 
individuals and households. This way CSOs are able to mobilize the requisite local 
knowledge and skills, trust and bonds of solidarity that helps staff to rapidly detect 
and effectively respond to Ebola [46].
5.6 Health financing
Lack of adequate funds invested in health system infrastructure such as local 
laboratory and diagnostic services; disease surveillance, purchase of supplies and 
training specialist work force were major obstacles in containing the West Africa 
outbreak. In order to address some of these investment gaps in the health systems 
of the affected countries, varied funding models were used by CSOs and philan-
thropic foundations and organizations to support the epidemic. These included: 
(1) foundations providing direct support to global health governing institutions 
such as the WHO and UN agencies, (2) international NGOs directly funding national 
governments, (3) foundations channeling funds through international NGOs,  
(4) international NGOs disbursing funds directly to local CBO implementing part-
ners, and (5) foundations deploying funds through other foundations to support 
governmental public health institutions [58].
Funding through these varied mechanisms were deployed to strengthen the 
health systems of the affected countries whiles responding to the epidemic in 
several ways. These included: (a) building ETUs and community health centers for 
treating victims, (b) constructing and rehabilitating water supply for treatment 
centers, (c) providing medical equipment and supplies; (d) running mass media 
public health information campaigns to boost media awareness of preventative 
measures, (e) providing training and support for community health workers and 
(f) building the capacity of governmental public health organizations in the devel-
opment of novel vaccines, diagnostic and therapeutic tools [59].
6. Challenges to CSOs engagement and lessons learnt
CSOs faced significant challenges in the countries affected by Ebola as the 
epidemic accelerated and valuable lessons were learned in the effort to address those 
challenges. While some emanated from factors intrinsically linked to the normative 
structure and functioning of CSOs, others can only be understood within the wider 
institutional frameworks through which national governments and transnational 
actors-with varying interests, degrees of power and ways of operating, currently 
respond to public health emergencies.
First, analyses of CSOs’ engagement have identified issues including: (1) failure 
to take cognisance of the local socio-cultural and political contexts in implementing 
seemingly technical EVD interventions, (2) poor response coordination among CSOs 
themselves or with national governments, and (3) the slowness with which CSOs 
already working in the affected countries shifted from a development approach to 
an emergency humanitarian method for fighting the epidemic [60]. Related recom-
mendations for more effectively engaging CSOs in public health emergencies of such 
a scale have included the need for CSOs to: (1) make their technical program activities 
politically and culturally sensitive to local contexts and needs, (2) support established 
Contemporary Developments and Perspectives in International Health Security - Volume 1
10
national government response coordination structures, rather than setting up parallel 
structures of their own, and (3) prioritize disease prevention, outbreak spread and 
saving lives over developmental activities during such health crises [61, 62].
Second, the WHO as the leading organization for global health governance 
faced significant challenges responding to the epidemic. Among several others, 
critics have cited politicization of the epidemic that compromised its ability 
to alert the global community, lack of skilled human resources and financial 
resources as barriers [60]. Suggested recommendations for enhancing the 
organization’s performance have included the need to revamp its leadership and 
governance systems, including the establishment of a dedicated unit for outbreak 
response, supported by a strong technical capacity, budget and clear lines of 
accountability. Others have also suggested adequate resourcing of the WHO 
through untied funds for flexible deployment in times of global health crises 
as well as the need to establish independent and politically-protected Standing 
Emergency Committees among international and country-level WHO representa-
tives. Such committees—it is argued—can quickly make declarations on infec-
tious diseases of public health importance for the requisite emergency responses 
to be implemented [62–65].
Third, regarding national governments, weak health governance and manage-
ment systems within the public health sector, including underdeveloped disease 
surveillance and alert systems, and other health systems challenges such as lack 
of financial, human and material resources have all been identified as hampering 
containment efforts of the epidemic [60]. Recommended changes for improving 
health governance in the affected countries have included the need for national 
governments to invest in detection and emergency response capacities within the 
framework of IHR regulations, assume local ownership in dealing with public 
health emergencies as well as working collaboratively with international partners to 
fight future epidemics [62–65].
Fourth, wider issues related to: (1) lack of reliable systems for sharing epidemio-
logical, genomic clinical data and processes for developing accurate or adaptable 
and diagnostic tests, drugs and vaccine platforms, (2) lack of flexibility in donors’ 
funding mechanisms and contracts and delays in disbursing funds and (3) the 
mounting of unnecessary trade bans and travel restrictions by outside governments’ 
that restricted the flow of humanitarian workers and supplies have been cited as 
additional constraints that need to be addressed to facilitate CSOs engagement in 
future public health emergencies [60].
Fifth, primary psychosocial and mental health impacts that are the direct and 
immediate consequences of the epidemic on human health have been recognized 
to potentially affect a wide group of people at the individual, community and 
international levels. At the individual level, such impacts have been attributed to 
the traumatic course of the infection, fear of death and experience of witness-
ing others dying, feelings of shame or guilt (e.g., from transmitting infection to 
others) and stigmatization and/or isolation from their communities. At the com-
munity level, a recurring pattern of anxiety ensues, with a loss of trust in health 
services, stigma and/or isolation, loss of support or coping resources resulting in 
disruptions of community and cultural life. At the international level, fear and 
anxiety (e.g., of infection), trauma (e.g., of international aid workers witnessing 
deaths caused by Ebola), stigmatization of health workers returning from affected 
countries all together, severely constrained the provision of resources (e.g., health 
workers and funding) in support of the epidemic. In order to address some of these 
primary humanitarian problems and impacts, it has been suggested that efforts 
should engage CSOs and communities, to rebuild health systems and trust and to 
limit stigma [66, 67].
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Finally, beyond these primary psycho-social impacts, the literature also attends 
to secondary socio-economic impacts, including negative effects that are not caused 
by the epidemic itself but by its unintended consequences. Such secondary impacts, 
which can span a longer period than the outbreak itself and affect a wider group of 
people include effects on: (1) the healthcare system, (2) water, sanitation and hygiene 
services, (3) people’s safety, (4) educational system, (5) food security and (6) house-
hold income [68, 69]. To better understand and develop policies to mitigate some of 
these impacts, recommendations have included the need to carry out comprehensive 
analysis of the wider social, economic and political impacts of the epidemic on the 
affected countries, communities and survivors as well as strengthening health systems 
and addressing the structural vulnerabilities that hampered containment efforts [70].
7.  Conclusions: CSOs and the strengthening of IHS and national health 
systems
This paper has made an initial case for better embedding CSOs’ roles in national 
health systems as a means of ensuring health security during public health 
emergencies such as EVD outbreaks. Using the WHO health system framework 
which comprises six independent but interrelated building blocks as an evaluative 
framework, this review finds that CSOs have played supplemental albeit critically 
important roles in filling health systems gaps in a manner that enabled national 
governments and global actors to contain the West Africa EVD outbreak. These 
roles have included: (1) support with the establishment of national Ebola response 
teams for coordinating the overall response, (2) developing surveillance and 
response systems to detect, track and treat disease, (3) provision and maintenance 
of safe health care services (e.g., ETUs for isolating patients) together with training 
of personnel on infection control procedures, (4) supporting the development and 
use of new vaccines, diagnostic and therapeutic tools, (5) mobilizing and training 
a wide-range of health workforce including clinicians, non-clinicians and com-
munity health workers, and (6) resourcing the epidemic response efforts through 
innovative funding mechanisms. Together these multiple functions of CSOs have 
been essential in containing the West Africa EVD outbreak and directs attention 
to specific areas at the backbone of any response to public health emergency, and 
where CSO-health system intersections can be particularly leveraged and better 
strengthened in LMICs. Moreover, this review has underscored several challenges 
intrinsic to CSOs’ and other global actors responding to the epidemic and suggested 
various recommendations for improvements in their performance.
Finally, if we understand IHS and health systems strengthening as a complex 
constellation of power relations in which actors (e.g., national governments, 
multilateral organizations such as the UN and WHO, bilateral and philanthropic 
donors and CSOs) deploy different types of resources (e.g., knowledge, money or 
political authority) to pursue diverse organizational interests, then, it is critically 
important to identify the unique functions CSOs perform within this system. This 
review sheds more light on such functions drawing on lessons from the imple-
mentation of the West Africa EVD response. What is needed is more in-depth 
understanding of the respective roles played by these varied global health actors 
working in collaboration with CSOs during public health emergencies. Moreover, 
beyond this preliminary mapping of CSOs’ roles using secondary data, systematic 
collection of primary data on the full range of global health actors responding 
to public health emergencies with CSOs as implementing partners is needed to 
provide a clearer understanding of how profitably CSOs might be better engaged 
in health crises that cross national boundaries.
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